NO. ____________________
In Tarrant County, Texas
Lisa Williams, Plaintiff,
KATIE BOGGEMAN, in her official capacity as 97th Judicial District Attorney; AMY ALLIN, in her official capacity as Judge of the 297th Judicial District Court; BOBBY LAPENNA, in his official capacity as Chief of Police; THE SHERIFF OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, in his or her official capacity; THE DIRECTOR OF THE CITY OF FORT WORTH JAIL, in his or her official capacity; and THE MEMBERS OF THE TARRANT COUNTY GRAND JURY, as a body, names unknown, Defendants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Randall Kelton (“Plaintiff”), suing individually and on behalf of all similarly situated citizens of Texas, and respectfully shows the Court as follows:
B. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar This Action Because Defendants Acted Ultra Vires
B. Boggeman Refused to Cite Authority and Refused to Request an Opinion, Violating the Statute
A. The Legislature Required Warrants to Be Executed Within Their Valid Period
A. The Legislature Commanded That Arrestees Be Taken Before a Magistrate Without Unnecessary Delay
B. Officers Took Diruzzo Directly to Jail and Concealed Him for Days Without Magistration
A. The Legislature Made Habeas Corpus a Mandatory Non-Discretionary Duty
B. Judge Allin Refused the Writ and Ordered Bailiffs to Remove the Petitioner
B. Defendants Have Normalized Criminal Conduct as Standard Procedure
VIII. DEFENDANTS MUST BE ENJOINED TO PERFORM THEIR MINISTERIAL DUTIES UNDER STATUTE
A. The Duties at Issue Are Ministerial, Not Discretionary
B. This Court Has Authority to Compel Compliance With Statutory Commands
IX. DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT IS ULTRA VIRES BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS WITH THE LAW AUTHORIZING THEM TO ACT
A. Officials Acting in Conflict With Statutory Constraints Are Ultra Vires
B. Defendants’ Practices Conflict With Multiple Statutory Commands
Constitutional Provisions
Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 9
Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 12
Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 13
Texas Constitution, Article II, Section 1
Statutes
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.003
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.004
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.006
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.06(a)
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.16(a)
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051
Texas Government Code Section 552.3215(e)
Texas Penal Code Section 30.02
Texas Penal Code Section 37.02
Texas Penal Code Section 37.03
Texas Penal Code Section 37.10
Texas Penal Code Section 39.02
Texas Penal Code Section 39.03
Cases
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. 2009)
John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas, 2015 WL 6120532 (Tex. App.)
Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)
State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
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Plaintiff is a Citizen and Resident of Texas. Plaintiff Randall Kelton is an individual and a citizen of the United States and the State of Texas who has suffered direct harm and is under continuing threat of harm due to Defendants’ systemic refusal to follow the plain text of Texas law.
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Defendants are State and Local Government Officials. The Defendants are public servants of the State of Texas and its political subdivisions, acting in their official capacities, whose ministerial duties (the specific, non-discretionary actions required by law) are established by the Texas Legislature.
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This Court Has Statutory Authority to Render a Declaratory Judgment. This action seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.001 et seq. This Court has the power to declare rights and legal relations to afford Plaintiff relief from the uncertainty and insecurity arising from Defendants’ refusal to follow existing law.
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A Justiciable Controversy Exists. An actual, live controversy exists between the parties concerning the proper construction and application of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Texas Penal Code, and Texas Government Code. Plaintiff’s rights are directly affected by Defendants’ interpretation and application of these statutes. As authorized by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.004, Plaintiff, whose rights are affected by these statutes, is entitled to have this Court determine any question of construction arising under them and obtain a declaration of his rights.
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This Suit Seeks to Compel Compliance With Law. This is not a suit for monetary damages against the state. It is a suit against government officials in their official capacities to compel them to comply with the ministerial duties imposed upon them by the Texas Legislature.
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Sovereign Immunity Does Not Protect Officials Who Violate the Law. The Texas Supreme Court has long held that sovereign immunity (the doctrine that prevents suits against the government without its consent) does not bar lawsuits brought to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Tex. 2009). Such a suit is not considered to be a suit against the State.
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Defendants’ Actions Are Ultra Vires. An official’s act is ultra vires (beyond legal authority) when the official acts without legal authority or fails to perform a purely ministerial act. See John Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas, 2015 WL 6120532 (Tex. App.). As detailed below, Defendants have engaged in a pattern of conduct that is without legal authority and in direct conflict with their mandatory, ministerial statutory duties. Therefore, sovereign immunity is waived, and this Court has jurisdiction.
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The Law Imposes a Ministerial Duty on District Attorneys. The Texas Public Information Act provides a specific, non-discretionary procedure for handling complaints that a district attorney has violated the Act. The Legislature commanded:
Texas Government Code Section 552.3215(e)
Not later than the 30th business day after the date the district or county attorney receives the complaint, the district or county attorney shall determine whether the district or county attorney’s office has complied with the requirements of this chapter and provide the complainant with a written statement of that determination. If the district or county attorney determines that the office has not complied with the requirements of this chapter, the district or county attorney shall provide the complainant with the records that are responsive to the request… or provide a new written statement… stating the specific provision of this chapter that excepts or makes confidential the information requested.
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Plaintiff Made a Lawful Request for Public Information. Plaintiff submitted a request under the Texas Public Information Act to Defendant Katie Boggeman, in her official capacity as 97th Judicial District Attorney, seeking the names of the currently empaneled Tarrant County Grand Jury members.
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Boggeman Unlawfully Refused the Request. Defendant Boggeman refused to provide the requested information. She failed and refused to provide a written statement citing any specific provision of law that would except the names from disclosure, and she failed and refused to seek an opinion from the Texas Attorney General regarding the request, as required by the statutory framework. This refusal to follow the ministerial duties of the Public Information Act directly impaired Plaintiff’s ability to report criminal offenses to the grand jury.
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The Grand Jury’s Duty to Investigate is Mandatory. The Texas Legislature vested the grand jury with a non-discretionary duty to investigate all crimes brought to its attention by credible sources. The statute uses the mandatory term “shall”:
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051
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The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of which any grand juror may have knowledge or of which the grand jury is informed by the attorney representing the state or by any other credible person.
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Plaintiff is a Credible Person Seeking to Report Offenses. Plaintiff possesses information about criminal offenses committed by public servants, including perjury, tampering with governmental records, and official oppression. As a “credible person,” Plaintiff has a statutory right to inform the grand jury of these offenses, and the grand jury has a statutory duty to inquire into them.
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Boggeman’s Secrecy Prevents Grand Jury Access. By unlawfully withholding the names of the grand jurors, Defendant Boggeman has effectively prevented Plaintiff from exercising his statutory right and duty to report crimes. Her actions have severed the direct line of communication between the people and the grand jury that the Legislature established, thereby obstructing the grand jury’s ability to fulfill its mandatory duty to investigate.
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A Warrant’s Authority is Time-Limited by Statute. The Legislature placed a strict time limit on the legal authority of an arrest warrant. An arrest warrant that is not executed within the specified timeframe expires and becomes legally void.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09
The period for executing an arrest warrant… expires at the end of the second anniversary of the date the warrant was issued.
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The Warrant Was Void When Executed. On August 5, 2025, law enforcement officers, including Tarrant County Sheriff’s Detective Brandt, executed a raid on a residence at 3208 Bedford Drive. The warrant used to authorize this raid had been issued on August 4, 2023, and, by statute, expired at the end of the day on August 4, 2025. When officers executed the warrant on August 5, 2025, it was legally void.
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The Entry Constituted Burglary and Official Oppression. Entry into a habitation with a void warrant is entry without effective consent. Such an entry, made with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault, constitutes the crime of Burglary of a Habitation under Texas Penal Code Section 30.02. This act also constitutes Official Oppression under Texas Penal Code Section 39.03. The affidavit used to obtain the warrant, sworn by Detective Brandt, is believed to contain false statements, constituting the crimes of Perjury and Tampering with a Governmental Record.
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The Press Was Unlawfully Excluded. During the raid, Defendant Chief Bobby LaPenna actively blocked and excluded members of the press from observing the police action, infringing on the public’s right to monitor government activity.
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The Duty to Present an Arrestee to a Magistrate is Mandatory. The Legislature mandated a clear, non-discretionary procedure for all arrests. Law enforcement officers are commanded by statute to take the arrested person before a magistrate for a probable cause determination “without unnecessary delay.”
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.06(a)
…the person making the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested shall take the person arrested or have him taken without unnecessary delay, but not later than 48 hours after the person is arrested, before the magistrate…
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.16(a)
The officer or person executing a warrant of arrest shall without unnecessary delay take the person or have him taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant…
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Mr. Diruzzo Was Unlawfully Arrested and Detained. On August 12, 2025, officers lured an individual named Diruzzo, a witness in a pending case, to a courthouse under false pretenses and arrested him.
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Officers Violated the Mandatory Duty to See a Magistrate. Instead of taking Mr. Diruzzo before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay” as commanded by statute, officers transported him directly to the Fort Worth Jail. He was then secreted within the jail system for several days, intentionally held incommunicado and deprived of his statutory and constitutional right to a prompt probable cause hearing before a neutral magistrate. This intentional act constitutes the crime of Official Oppression.
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The Writ of Habeas Corpus is a Writ of Right. The Legislature has declared that the writ of habeas corpus (a court order directing that a prisoner be brought before the court to determine the lawfulness of the detention) is a writ of right and shall be granted without delay. The duty to issue the writ upon proper application is ministerial, not discretionary.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05
The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right and shall never be suspended. It is the duty of the court or judge, on proper application, to issue the writ under the rules prescribed by law.
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A Proper Application for the Writ Was Made. On August 15, 2025, an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the unlawfully detained Mr. Diruzzo was presented in open court to Defendant Judge Amy Allin.
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Judge Allin Violated Her Ministerial Duty. Despite the clear legislative command, Defendant Judge Allin refused to issue the writ of habeas corpus. She did not rule on the merits or find the application deficient. Instead, she refused to act on the application and ordered her bailiffs to physically remove the petitioner’s representative from her courtroom, thereby violating her mandatory, non-discretionary duty under Article 11.05.
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The Law Forbids Public Servants From Misusing Their Office. The Texas Legislature has made it a crime for a public servant to intentionally misuse his or her official power to harm citizens.
Texas Penal Code Section 39.03(a)
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A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he:
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intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful;
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intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful…
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Defendants’ Actions Form a Pattern of Criminal Conduct. The actions described herein are not isolated mistakes; they represent a pattern and practice of intentional disregard for the law. These acts include: the unlawful detention of Mr. Diruzzo, the denial of his right to magistration, the impediment of Plaintiff’s right to access the grand jury, the unlawful search and seizure at 3208 Bedford Drive under a void warrant, and the denial of the right to habeas corpus.
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This Conduct is Abuse of Official Capacity. These actions constitute a systemic violation of Texas Penal Code Section 39.02 (Abuse of Official Capacity) and Texas Penal Code Section 39.03 (Official Oppression). Defendants are treating clear statutory prohibitions as discretionary guidelines, thereby creating a system where the rights of citizens are subject to the whims of officials rather than the rule of law.
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The Legislature Used Mandatory Language. The statutes at issue use mandatory, non-discretionary language such as “shall” and “duty.” The duty to take an arrestee before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay,” the duty to issue the writ of habeas corpus “on proper application,” the duty of the grand jury to “inquire into all offenses,” and the duty to follow the procedures of the Public Information Act are all ministerial duties.
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Defendants Have No Discretion to Ignore the Law. Defendants have no legal discretion to ignore these statutory commands. An official’s belief that a statutory command is inefficient or inconvenient does not convert a ministerial duty into a discretionary one.
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Declaratory and Injunctive Relief are Proper Remedies. This Court has the power under the UDJA to declare the rights, status, and legal relations of the parties under these statutes. This Court also possesses inherent equitable power to issue an injunction to prohibit Defendants from continuing to act unlawfully and to compel them to perform their non-discretionary statutory duties. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to address this systemic refusal to follow the law.
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Ultra Vires Acts Include Actions in Conflict With Law. As the Texas Court of Appeals has held, an official acts ultra vires not only when acting without any authority, but also when acting “in conflict with the constraints of the law authorizing [them] to act.” See Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company, L.P. v. Texas Department of Transportation, 2022 WL 1543717 (Tex. App.).
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The Legislature Has Exclusive Authority to Set Penal Law. The Texas Legislature possesses the exclusive authority to define crimes and establish criminal procedures. See State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The executive and judicial branches are constitutionally bound to follow the procedures enacted by the Legislature.
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Defendants’ Practices are in Direct Conflict With Statute. The practice of taking arrestees directly to jail instead of to a magistrate is in direct conflict with the “without unnecessary delay” command of Articles 14.06 and 15.16. The practice of refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on proper application is in direct conflict with the mandatory duty of Article 11.05. The practice of refusing Public Information Act requests without citing authority is in direct conflict with Government Code Section 552.3215.
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These Practices Are Void. Because these practices are in direct conflict with the statutes authorizing Defendants to act, they are ultra vires and legally void. Defendants must be ordered to cease these unlawful practices and conform their conduct to the ministerial duties prescribed by the Texas Legislature.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff Randall Kelton respectfully prays that this Court:
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Declare that the practice of refusing Public Information Act requests for grand juror names without citing specific statutory authority for the exception or requesting an Attorney General opinion is a violation of the Texas Government Code;
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Declare that refusing to provide the names of grand jurors to a credible person seeking to report offenses constitutes an unlawful impediment to the grand jury’s mandatory duty to inquire under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051;
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Declare that the execution of an arrest warrant after the expiration date provided by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09 is unlawful and that entry into a habitation under the authority of a void warrant constitutes Burglary under Texas Penal Code Section 30.02;
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Declare that the practice of transporting an arrested person directly to jail for booking and processing before taking that person to a magistrate for a probable cause hearing violates the “without unnecessary delay” command of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 14.06 and 15.16;
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Declare that the duty of a judge to issue a writ of habeas corpus upon proper application under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05 is a non-discretionary, ministerial duty;
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Declare that the pattern of conduct described herein constitutes the crime of Official Oppression under Texas Penal Code Section 39.03;
G. Issue a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants and their agents from engaging in the unlawful practices described herein;
H. Issue a permanent injunction compelling Defendants and their agents to perform their ministerial duties in strict compliance with the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Texas Penal Code, and Texas Government Code;
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Award Plaintiff his costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.009; and
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Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief, both at law and in equity, to which he may show himself justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
Randall
Kelton
Plaintiff, Pro Se
[Address]
[City,
State, Zip]
[Phone]
[Email]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of July, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief was served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure upon each Defendant via certified mail, return receipt requested, at their official business addresses.
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